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1 Introduction
Illegal immigration, from less developed countries to rich countries, is one of the most
controversial topics around. Moreover, received wisdom has it that the issue will become
more and more important as the 21st century progresses. Images of "fortress Europe",
with hordes of impoverished people knocking at the gates are the basis upon which many a
right-wing European politician bases his or her legitimacy.
To the Ethier(1986) and Djajic (1987) theoretical models, which analyze illegal migration,
can be added the Friebel and Guriev (2006) model, which introduces nancial constraints
between illegal migrants and intermediaries. However, the ow of illegal migrants has been
studied above all in the case of the USA and Mexico. Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999)
identify the economic volatility in Mexico, the high real wage in the US and then the large
wage di¤erentials, as the main causes of illegal migration between the two countries. The
geographic proximity and the networks are other determinants. Networks, for example, help
to make the link between US employers and migrants, to obtain a future regularization for
individuals with families legally installed or to reduce migration costs in general (Munshi,
2003; Hanson, 2006). Hanson, Robertson and Spilimbergo (2002) study the e¤ect of border
control enforcement on the labor market in the US and Mexican border regions in the context
of illegal migration. Nevertheless, contrary to press reports, which document the tragic plight
of groups of illegal migrants drifting o¤ the coasts of the Canary Islands or Sicily, academic
studies of the phenomenon of illegal migration, particularly when it comes from Africa, are
few and far between. Chiuri, de Arcangelis, DUggento, and Ferri (2007) document the
characteristics of illegal migrants to Italy based on a sample of individuals picked up by
Italian immigration authorities and held under lock and key in various detention centers.
In the beginning of the intensication of illegal migration in Africa, the roads were the
principal way used by illegal African migrants. They crossed by Maghreb countries and the
Straits of Gibraltar to reach European coasts. But the control of those roads has transferred
the problem. Illegal migrants, now, take sea routes to get round borders control. It is this
new form of illegal migration which has strongly developed in Senegal, which justies our
country choice. Thus, we conducted a eld survey between November 2006 and April 2007
on 400 individuals in Dakar. As far as we know, no survey comparable to this one has
been realized, which makes our study original. One of the main contributions of this paper
is that from a theoretical model, we study how preferences and expectations a¤ect illegal
migration decision and the willingness to pay a smuggler with a probability of success equal
to 1. Then we evaluate theoretically a measure of time and risk preferences through the
individual discount rates and the individual coe¢cients of absolute risk aversion that we
calculate and we use them as independent variables in our estimations. Secondly, we test
empirically our model and nally we analyze how preferences and expectations a¤ect the
choice of a method of migration.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section presents a model of the illegal mi-
gration decision and the willingness to pay a smuggler with a probability of success equal
to 1. In Section 3 we evaluate, theoretically, the expressions of the individual discount
1
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rates and the individual coe¢cients of absolute risk aversion that we calculate in order to
make our estimations, while the di¤erent methods of migration are presented in Section 4.
Then, we present the data, the descriptive statistics and the estimation strategy in Section
5. The empirical results are discussed in Section 6 and nally, concluding remarks and policy
implications are provided in the last section.
2 Migration decision and Willingness to pay
2.1 The migration decision
Let the monthly wage in Senegal be denoted by w, and the expected wage in the destina-
tion country be denoted by w. The one-shot cost of reaching the destination will be denoted
by C with associated probability of success p. Consider a simple present discounted value
(PDV) calculation, in which t represents the current age of the individual, T his retirement
age, and  his discount rate. Preferences are assumed to be represented by a utility function
denoted by u(:). Then the intertemporal welfare associated with an unsuccessful attempt at
leaving Senegal at time 0, and therefore remaining there from time 0 until retirement at age
T , while earning a constant monthly wage w is given by:
V UE = u (w   C) + u (w)
=T tX
=1
1
(1 + )
= u (w   C) + u (w)
1  (1 + )t T

; (1)
(where the superscript UE stands for unsuccessful emigration). Conversely, assume that
the attempt at emigrating is successful, costs C and results in earning the foreign wage w
starting at  = 1. This yields an intertemporal welfare given by:
V SE = u (w   C) + u (w)
1  (1 + )t T

; (2)
(where the superscript SE stands for successful emigration). In what follows, we will refer
to 1 (1+)
t T

as the individuals "intertemporal discount rate". The expected value of the
attempt at emigration is therefore given by E [V ] = pV SE + (1  p)V UE. Substituting from
(1) and (2) yields:
E [V ] = u (w   C) + [pu (w) + (1  p) u (w)]
1  (1 + )t T

: (3)
Let the intertemporal welfare associated with remaining in Senegal and earning a wage w
from t = 0 to t = T be given by:
V = u (w)
(1 + )  (1 + )t T

(4)
2
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An individual will attempt to emigrate when E [V ] > V , which can be written, by substi-
tuting from (3) and (4) and simplifying the ensuing expression, as:
u (w   C)  u (w) + p [u (w)  u (w)]
1  (1 + )t T

> 0: (5)
The preceding model is, of course, extremely reminiscent of the standard approaches due
to Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970), and the comparative statics described in
Proposition 1 are intuitively what one would expect.
What is the di¤erence between legal and illegal migration in terms of the theoretical
model? A rst stylized fact is that the likelihood of success of legal migration out of
Senegal is extremely low. In particular, perceptions by most individuals would be that this
probability is signicantly lower than the probability of success through illegal migration.
A second characteristic of legal migration is that the associated administrative costs are
very low (usually amounting to the cost of the visa application and the documents that
must be submitted along with it), though the airfare to the potential destination country
does increase the overall cost, particularly when compared with the cost of illegal migration
methods.
If we allow the expression given in (3) to represent the case of illegal migration, and carry
out a similar PDV calculation for legal migration,where the probability of success is denoted
by q < p and the cost is denoted by K, we obtain:
E

V illegal

= u (w   C) + [pu (w) + (1  p) u (w)]
1  (1 + )t T

;
E

V legal

= u (w  K) + [qu (w) + (1  q) u (w)]
1  (1 + )t T

:
The individual will then prefer illegal over legal migration when E

V illegal

> E

V legal

,
which can be written explicitly as:
u (w   C)  u (w  K) + (p  q) (u (w)  u (w))
1  (1 + )t T

> 0: (6)
Consider the two following second-order Taylor expansions:
u (w   C)  u(w)  Cu0(w) +
C2
2
u00(w);
u (w  K)  u(w) Ku0(w) +
K2
2
u00(w):
3
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Then one can rewrite (6) as:
(K   C) u0(w)

1 +
1
2
(C +K)

 
u00(w)
u0(w)

| {z }
u(w C) u(w K)
+ (p  q) (u (w)  u (w))
1  (1 + )t T

> 0:
(7)
One can then immediately establish the following Proposition by straightforward di¤erenti-
ation of (7):
Proposition 1 The likelihood that an individual chooses to illegal over legal emigration is:
(i) an increasing function of the intertemporal discount rate 1 (1+)
t T

, (ii) an increasing
function of the expected foreign wage, (iii) a decreasing function of the cost of illegal migra-
tion, (iv) an increasing (decreasing) function of risk-aversion when K   C > (<) 0
Proposition 1 establishes clear comparative statics results for all variables of interest,
with the exception of risk-aversion, for which the comparative statics are ambiguous.
2.2 The Willingness to pay a smuggler
We consider the willingness to pay a smuggler with a probability of success equal to 1,
which we denote by C. This willingness to pay is implicitly dened by the solution in C
to the following equation:
u (w   C)  u (w) + [u (w)  u (w)]
1  (1 + )t T

= 0:
By the same second-order Taylor expansion as above, this can be rewritten as:
[u (w)  u (w)]
1  (1 + )t T

 

u0(w)C  
C2
2
u00(w)

= 0;
or
[u (w)  u (w)]
1  (1 + )t T

  u0(w)

C +
C2
2

 
u00(w)
u0(w)

= 0: (8)
By the Implicit Function Theorem, one can then immediatley establish the following Propo-
sition:
Proposition 2 The price that an individual is willing to pay a smuggler for an illegal im-
migration attempt with probability 1 of success is: (i) an increasing function of the intertem-
poral discount rate 1 (1+)
t T

, (ii) an increasing function of the expected foreign wage, (iii)
an ambiguous function of the domestic wage, (iv) a decreasing function of risk-aversion.
Proof. See the Appendix for details.
The only ambiguity in the willingness to pay a smuggler for an illegal immigration attempt
with probability 1 of success is associated with the e¤ect of the domestic wage. All other
comparative statics results for our model including the e¤ect of risk-aversion are clearcut.
4
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3 Infering preferences
Let the lump sum payment necessary to induce an individual not to leave Senegal be
denoted by D. Indi¤erence between remaining in Senegal and receiving the lump sum pay-
ment D at  = 0 (with associated intertemporal welfare V LS = u (w +D)+u (w) 1 (1+)
t T

,
where the superscript LS stands for lump sum), and the expected value of an attempt at
emigration with cost Cj and probability of success pj (with associated intertemporal welfare
E [V ]) therefore yields 0 = E [V ]  V LS, which can be expressed more explicitly as:
0 = u (w   Cj) + [pju (w
)  pju (w)]
1  (1 + )t T

  u (w +D) : (9)
The reason for indexing the pair (Cj; pj) by j will become apparent in what follows. If
retirement age is considered indenitely far away by individuals (T ! 1) and individuals
are risk neutral (u (w) = w) then (9) simplies to D =
pj(w

 w)

 Cj. Given the appropriate
data, which include various values of the cost Cj individuals are willing to bear in order
to achieve migration success with a given known probability pj, equation (9) allows one to
recover both the discount rate  and risk aversion in the context of the emigration decision.
We show this in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 If the individual is willing to emigrate at cost Cj (Ck) with associated proba-
bility of success pj (pk), and is willing to forego emigration in return for a lump-sum payment
D, then:
(i) the individuals coe¢cient of absolute risk-aversion is given by
A(w) = 2
pj (Ck +D)  pk (Cj +D)
pj (D2   C2k)  pk
 
D2   C2j
 ;
(ii) the individuals discount rate is dened by
1  (1 + )t T

=
(Cj +D) (Ck +D) (Ck   Cj)
w [pj (Ck +D) (Ck +w  D)  pk (Cj +D) (Cj +w  D)]
:
Proof. The proof follows from a second-order Taylor expansion of (9), and noticing that
the ensuing expression holds for any two gambles (Cj; pj) and (Ck; pk). See the Appendix
for details.
For each individual, we have ve gambles (Cj; pj). There are therefore 4+3+2+1 =
10 possible versions of the two expressions given in Proposition 3. For each individual, we
can therefore compute a mean value of A(w) and 1 (1+)
t T

, with an associated standard
deviation.
4 Methods of migration
There are essentially three ways of going about an attempt at migration in Senegal. The rst
method is completely legal and we name it the "visa method". It consists to apply directly
5
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for a legal visa and pay the visa fees and the airfare to reach the destination country.
The second method of reaching a destination country is illegal and will be referred to as
the "canoe method". This involves paying a fee to a "passeur" (literally, a smuggler of
human beings). The "passeurs", using various types of motorized dugout canoes, large
rubber dinghies, and various overland routes towards Morocco, Tunisia and Libya, attempt
to get potential migrants to various destination countries, often Spain, Italy or France. The
third, which involves obtaining what is, to all intents and purposes, a legitimate visa for a
destination country, will be denoted as the "embassy method". This approach depends upon
the existence of corrupt o¢cials within the consular sections of many embassies in Dakar
who, for a fee, will provide an entry visa for the country in question. This method has a very
high likelihood of success, which we will assume for simplicity to be equal to 1, but which is
the most expensive way to migrate. For obvious reasons, including the tenuous nature of the
boats being used, as well as the perilous nature of the overland journey up the coast of West
Africa, the probability of success of the canoe method is much lower than with the embassy
method. The "passeur" price is, therefore, much lower than "embassy" price.
5 Data and estimates of preferences
5.1 Data
Because of the extent of illegal migration in Senegal these last years and the lack of
economic data on the subject, we collected new data by making a eld survey. A cross-
section survey was gathered between November 2006 and April 2007. We interviewed 400
respondents met randomly in the selected neighborhoods. Among them, some are potential
migrants and some are not. We consider only individuals who wish to migrate because this
accounts for 92% of our total sample, i.e. 367 individuals. This value seems high but it
is not very surprising. We have some variability in the di¤erent areas where we made the
survey and the proportion of people who wish to migrate is high in all these areas. Many
factors, particularly historical and sociological, can explain this result. Indeed, Dakar is
a "europeanized" city compared with other West-African cities which were former French
colonies. Dakar was the A.O.F (Afrique Occidentale Française) capital city and the links
with the colonialists were very close1. In Senegal, both in rural and urban areas, in many
households with good living conditions, there are one or many family members who have
migrated. Migrants have an important economic power which sparks o¤ the envy of those
who remain in the origin country. They invest in buildings, business and social services
for the community. Moreover, remittances sent to the family increase the gap between the
reference group and those who do not have migrants in their family. Then, for the latter,
the social comparison with the reference group increases the frustration and the relative
feelings of deprivation. The third explanation is that the Eldorado myth still exists and the
development of Information Technology, such as the Internet, increase the attractiveness of
the destination countries. Therefore, for many people, migration is considered as the only
way to succeed.
1For instance, Senegalese people who lived in some communes were French citizens.
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Among the 367 individuals who wish to migrate, 222 are willing to migrate only legally
and 145 are ready to migrate illegally (which represents 40% of potential migrants). We
interviewed individuals who were still in Senegal and interviews were conducted face to face
with closed questions. For more e¢ciency, we rstly dened Dakar, as the analysis unit
for its accessibility and above all for the variety of its population. Subsequently, we made
a sub-stratication rstly by picking several neighborhoods, then, within these areas, some
individuals. Concentrating resources on a part of the population allows us a better quality
of data and more precise results, even if it is an exploratory study because all the population
of Dakar is not represented.
5.2 Descriptive Statistics
The summary statistics are presented in Table 1. The average expected wage of potential
migrant is 1 567 466 Fcfa i.e. 2 389 Euros. This amount is far from the truth since we know
that in France, for example, according to INSEE2, the available income for a middle class
household is between 1100 Euros and 1700 Euros in 2006. 80% of the French population
earn between less than 1100 Euros and 2400 Euros every month. The wage in Senegal is
approximated by the average monthly expenditures of the individuals, because people answer
more easily about their expenditures and then there are less missing data for this variable.
The latter is estimated at 76 055 Fcfa ie 115.94 Euros, which is very low compared to the
expected wage.
Figure 1 shows the histogram of the mean value of individual coe¢cients of absolute risk
aversion A(w). We calculate these values from the proposition 3 of the theoretical model.
We observe that the individual coe¢cients of absolute risk aversion are very close to 0, which
means that the individuals are risk neutral. They do not care about risks they take with
illegal migration, which is a strong signal of their tenacity. This is conrmed in Table 2 where
we present the descriptive statistics of the willingness to pay a smuggler of those who wish
to migrate illegally, associated with di¤erent probabilities of success. We observe that as the
probability of success decreases, the less the part of individuals who are ready to migrate
is important. But this proportion remains high compared to the risk taken. Indeed, with a
probability of success of 5%, 53% of people are still willing to migrate illegally. Moreover,
the di¤erence between the amount they are ready to pay with a probability of success of 1
and a probability of success of 0.05 is quite low. It is estimated at only 216 356 Fcfa i.e. 329
Euros. These amounts can appear high in the case of Senegal, but they are very realistic.
The willingness to pay a smuggler, with a probability equal to 1, corresponds approximately
to the monthly expected wage of potential migrants. Indeed, the latter are well informed
about di¤erent prices on the illegal migration market. Thus, it is likely that if they nance
their migration by a loan, which is often the case, they plan to pay o¤ the smuggler with
their rst salary earned in the host country.
2INSEE, Intitut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, is the national institute of Statistics
in France (website:www.insee.fr).
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5.3 Estimation Strategy
The aim of this section is rst to show the e¤ect of the discount rate, the expected
foreign wage per capita and the risk aversion, which are our main variables of interest in the
illegal migration decision. We also consider as control variables other factors which inuence
this decision. Secondly, we study empirically the e¤ect of the individual preferences for
time and risk and the expectations on the willingness to pay a smuggler with a probability
of success equal to 1 as the dependent variable. Individuals will pay a smuggler only if
they are ready to migrate illegally, thus the willingness to pay is observed only for the part
of the sample that wishes to migrate. In this case, we do not have a random selection.
Then, to avoid a selection bias and a specication error, we use a Heckman procedure
(Heckman, 1979). The second reason to use this procedure is that, we cannot make directly
a linear regression, by just replacing the value of the willingness to pay a smuggler by 0
for individuals who do not want to migrate, because it may induce confusion with potential
illegal migrants who are not willing to pay anything to a smuggler. The Heckman procedure
consists of a two-step estimation: a selection estimation which explains the participation and
an outcome estimation where the correlation between the random disturbances is accounted
for by including the Inverse of Mills Ratio (IMR). It is used in the outcome equation to
estimate the coe¢cients of the model. If it is omitted, we will have an omitted variable
bias (Greene, 2008). We estimate the selection equation by a probit model and the outcome
equation by a linear model. Then we have:
Selection equation: Mi = i + k1ixki + 2izi + i; Mi = 1 if M

i > 0 and Mi = 0 otherwise
Outcome equation: yi = i + k2ixki + 2ii + "i; yi is observed only when Mi = 1
Where:
i and i are the intercepts;  and , represent the vectors of parameters;  and " are
the random disturbances and i is the Inverse of Mills Ratio (IMR).
Mi = 1 if the individual i is willing to migrate illegally and 0 if he is only willing to
migrate legally (legal versus illegal).
yi represents the logarithm of the willingness to pay a smuggler with a probability of
success equal to 1.
xki is a vector of variables composed of the variables of interest and two groups of variables
of control.
The variables of interest are:
- individual discount rates represented by 1 (1+)
t T

and calculated from the proposition
3 in the theoretical model.
- logarithm of the expected foreign wage of potential migrants divided by the number of
dependants, which gives the value per capita. The expected foreign wage is obtained from
the question: "How much would you expect to earn in the host country?". Through this
variable, and more largely, through the income gap, we are interested in the expectations of
individuals. More generally, in the literature, expectations are an important element which
predicts migration decision-making. Van Dalen, Groenewold and Schoorl (2005) highlight
the e¤ect of expectations on migration intentions. Mckenzie, Gibson, and Stillman (2007)
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consider the expectations of Tongan immigrants to New Zealand concerning their likely
wage conditions upon arrival. De Jong (2000) is interested in the role of expectations on
migration behavior in Thailand whereas Sabates-Wheeler, Natali and Taylor (2009), from
a Ghanaian study show the importance of reliable information in the formation of realistic
expectations and a positive migration experience. In our case, we consider expectations as
a triggering factor in the decision to migrate illegally and assume that they play a decisive
role in potential illegal migrants plans.
- logarithm of the individual coe¢cients of absolute risk aversion A(w) calculated from
the theoretical model.
- logarithm of the prices of the destination countries representing the migration costs
In the rst group of the variables of control, we have the other factors which inuence
illegal migration:
- the variable "stay if hardening of immigration policies" which is a dummy equal to 1 if
the potential migrant renounces migration and stays in Senegal if the immigration policies
in the host countries were hardened. It allows us to see how the hardening of immigration
policies in host countries would a¤ect legal and illegal migration decision-making.
- the variable "relatives" a dummy equal to 1 if the individual has some members of
his family, close friends or just relatives, who migrated. It allows taking into account the
networks e¤ects. Illegal migration can be explained by the fact that for people who do not
get enough money or assets, networks become an important determinant for the propensity
to migrate. Having relatives contributes to reduction in the costs related to migration.
Indeed, there is a threshold from which migrants numbers in receiving countries involves a
decrease of migration costs (Carrington, Detragiache, Vishwanath, 1996). One of the reasons
of this relation is that migrants, who have already gone, have an implicit obligation to help
newcomers. Furthermore, the expected benets depend on the productivity and the abilities
of the migrants. But for illegal migrants, the benets are also function of the probability not
to be turned back (Borjas, 1987). We assume that this probability decreases if the migrant
knows someone in the receiving country.
In the second group, we control for socio-demographics characteristics such as age and its
squared, sex, matrimonial situation, education level, home occupation status (dummy equal
to 1 if the individual is a home owner, in order to control for the assets), religious and ethnic
dummies.
zi is the exclusion variable represented by the share of male children on the total number
of dependants that the individual has to support. We assume that the larger the number of
male children relative to the number of dependants is, the lower will be the probability to
migrate illegally; and it has no impact on the willingness to pay a smuggler with a probability
of success equal to 1. Indeed, for purposes of responsability, we assume that generally, if the
share of children who depends on the decision maker is high, it will decrease his propensity
to migrate illegally. We are interesting in the male children because more male children in
the household allow the decision maker to diversify his revenue stream. He can for instance
send one of his sons to school, another can help him in his job and another can migrate3.
3In Africa, in particular, illegal migration is essentially a masculine phenomenon, even if there are in-
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He does not need to nd "extreme" solution such as illegal migration. Then we think that
this variable does not explain the willingness to pay a smuggler and is independent of the
second-step estimation because potential illegal migrants are on the demand side and on
the illegal migration market, prices are determined by the supply side represented by the
smugglers. Contrary to Konseiga (2007), for example, who use the number of boys under 12
years old to identify a seasonal and non migrant household indicator, by assuming that this
variable does not a¤ect the household income, we think that in our case, the share of male
children is a better exclusion variable than just the number of children.
6 Results
6.1 Estimation with the Heckman procedure
Table 3 reports the results of the Heckman procedure. The marginal e¤ects of the probit
estimation are reported in Table 4. The results show that our theoretical propositions are
conrmed by our estimations. In accordance with our theoretical predictions, it appears in
the two-step estimations, that the individual discount rates have a signicant and positive
e¤ect on the propensity to migrate illegally and on the willingness to pay a smuggler with a
probability of success equal to 1. An increase in the discount rate makes the illegal migration
project more attractive and more protable than the legal migration. Then, if the individual
preference for the present is higher, the decision maker, to have an immediate income, will
prefer illegal migration rather than waiting to have a better level of education or better
qualications which could make the achievement of a legal visa easier. Moreover, a legal
procedure, can take a lot of time and many attempts before succeeding. Indeed, people who
have the possibility to migrate legally are those who are educated and have a qualied job,
in other words, individuals who have invested in human capital or in an activity, which allow
them to have legitimate documents and to engage in legal migration.
An increase of 10 points of percentage of the log of the expected wage per capita increases
the probability to migrate illegally by only 8.9 points of percentage while the discount rate
increase the propensity to migrate illegally by 29.3% (Column (1) in Table 4). We also
nd that in accordance with the theory, the expectations and the discount rate increase the
willingness to pay a smuggler with a probability of success equal to 1. However, the log
of the wage earned in Senegal does not appear signicant, which conrms the ambiguous
function of this variable in our theoretical predictions. It appears that the di¤erential income
is signicant and positive. Then, it is very likely that the decision maker compares what
he gets, in Senegal, with the expected foreign earnings, a pull factor which plays a decisive
role in illegal migration. We can also say that the higher expectations are, the higher will
be the amount people are ready to pay to guarantee them a successful migration. The
expected wage value can often be evaluated on what potential migrants think about the
salaries of their relatives who have already migrated; that may be one of the causes of the
gap between reality on the one hand and expectations on the other. The Eldorado myth
creasing numbers of women who attempt it.
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persists and relatives keep it going. This is conrmed by the e¤ect of the control variable
"relatives" which increase the probability to migrate illegally. Firstly, networks are integrated
in migration plans because they give assistance for housing or employment and they also help
to reduce the psychological costs associated with migration. They are a source of information
on the locations and a¤ect the destination choice of those who wish to migrate and who take
into account ethnic, cultural and social proximity (Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2009; Epstein and
Gang, 2006). Besides, Azam and Gubert (2005) highlight in the case of Malian migrants,
that remittances, associated with migration allow the family in the country of origin; not only
an insurance against risks but they also help to reinforce the social status and the familys
dignity. In illegal migration, this social aspect is very important. Remittances exacerbate
frustration and social pressure on those who have stayed in the origin countries by improving
the relative income of migrants families compared to the other community members (Stark
and Taylor, 1989).
The risk aversion is not signicant at the rst step, which can conrm the ambiguity of
the comparative statistics concerning the e¤ect of this variable on the probability to migrate
illegally, but it is signicant and decreases the willingness to pay a smuggler. Then, the
less people are risk averse, the more they are willing to pay a smuggler with a probability of
success equal to 1. Indeed, paying a smuggler induces de facto a nancial risk associated with
the nature of the project that only the most determined can take. Thus for the smugglers,
the behavior of these less risked averse individuals can be a sort of signal to determine the
most risky"clients" and therefore raise their prices for this category of people.
There is a negative relationship between the migration costs and the probability to be
willing to migrate illegally. The main reason is that illegal migration is an expensive project,
which requires large funds that the poorest cannot a¤ord. These amounts often involve
taking loans to nance migration or years of savings. But we note that this variable becomes
insignicant at the second step, which shows that potential migrants once they are ready
to migrate illegally, are strongly motivated and the migration costs no longer constitute a
constraint in their willingness to pay.
For the control variables, if the immigration policies in host countries are hardened, the
probability to stay in Senegal, and then to renounce migration, decreases for those who are
willing to migrate illegally whereas it increases for those who would migrate only by a legal
way. In other words, a hardening of migration policies to enter host countries would have a
less important e¤ect on individuals who are ready to migrate illegally than on those who want
to migrate only legally, which is a very interesting result. Indeed, when immigration policies
are hardened, individuals have more hurdles to go through legally, thus contrary to the initial
objectives, these policies may have pernicious e¤ects by discouraging legal migration and by
involving an increased ow of illegal migrants. In addition, it will increase the willingness to
pay a smuggler to have more chances to achieve the project, which is a very high probability.
This result conrms a part of the Friebel and Guriev (2006) theory where strict immigration
policies increase nancial constraints and strengthen debt contracts between illegal migrants
and smugglers.
The exclusion variable represented by the share of male children on the total number of
dependants really identies the selection equation since it is signicant at 5% and decreases
11
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2011.04
the probability to migrate illegally. The IMR is not signicant, which means that there is
no selection bias.4
6.2 The Choice of the Method of Migration
The Heckman procedure allows us to show how preferences and expectations a¤ect
illegal migration decision and the willingness to pay a smuggler with a probability of success
equal to 1. In this part, we are interesting in the e¤ect of these variables on the choice
of the method of migration. During the survey, we observed that there are three ways
to migrate to the Northern destination countries: to go legally by applying directly for a
legal visa and paying the airfare, we name it "visa method"; using "canoe method" which
involves paying a fee to a smuggler or "embassy method", whereby one pay someone to
have legitimate documents, the two latter being considered as illegal. Indeed, we consider
the "embassy method" as an illegal method because even if people enter legally in the
host country with legal documents, they use corruption, which is an illegal way to get
legal documents. Moreover, the "embassy method" is very expensive, whereas if it was
legal, it will cost nothing, except the visa fees and the price of the airfare. These methods
are associated with di¤erent probabilities of success. Then, it is interesting to know what
explains the choice of the method of migration. We use a conditional logit model given that
we have three possible choices with some alternative characteristics called the attributes of
the choice and some individual characteristics5 (Greene, 2008). As a conditional logit is a
random utility model, we suppose a decision maker, here the potential migrant i, who can
choose from J alternatives. Then the utility of the choice j is:
Uij = 
0xij + 
0
jwi + ij
We assume that i chooses j because U
ij
is the maximum utility obtained from the di¤erent
choices. Then we have:
Pr(Uij > Uik) for k 6= j
Let Yi the variable indicating the three alternatives. According to McFadden (1974), if the
error terms of the di¤erent alternatives are independent and identically distributed with a
Gumbell distribution, we have:
Pr(Y i = j) =
exp(0xij + 
0
jwi)PJ
j=1 exp(
0xij + 0jwi)
Where:
4The observations are 281 instead of 367 at the srt step and 121 instead of 145 at the second step because
of missing values due rst to the wage in Senegal, even if we take the monthly expenditures as proxy of this
variable, that already allows us to decrease the number of missing values. Second, it is due to indetermined
discount rates and coe¢cients of absolute risk aversion for some individuals who decide to not migrate from
a certain probability of success less than one. For these people we cannot form all the gambles (Cj ; pj)
necessary to calculate the variables of preferences.
5Actually, it is a combination between a multinomial and a conditional logit, respectively to see the e¤ects
of the individual characteristics and the alternative characteristics on the probability to choose one category.
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Yi = 1 if the potential migrant wants to migrate only legally and would use the "visa
method". It is the reference category.
Yi = 2 if the potential migrant is willing to migrate illegally and would use the "canoe
method".
Yi = 3 if the potential migrant is willing to migrate illegally and would use the "embassy
method".
wi is a vector of individual variables which are the characteristics of the decision maker.
wi is composed of the same variables presented in the Heckman procedure. 
0
j is the vector
of parameters of each alternative J associated with individual characteristics. As our model
allows individual specic variables, we have to create interaction terms with dummy variables
for the choice and we multiply them by the individual characteristics (Greene, 2008).
xij contains the attributes of the choice. In our case, we have one alternative specic
variable which is the variable "log costs" representing the logarithm of the known prices for
the destination countries for each alternative. 0 is the vector of parameters associated to
xij
6.
The conditional logit must respect the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
property. It requires that the odds ratio between two alternatives is independent of the
other choices (Mc Fadden, 1974). It means that if we assume individuals have the choice
between the "visa method" and the "canoe method" and if one introduced another method
of migration such as the "embassy method", it would not a¤ect the relative probability of
an individual choosing either the "visa" or the "canoe" method. Our alternatives can be
considered as di¤erent because the "canoe" and the "embassy" methods are very di¤erent:
the "embassy method" is more expensive but safer and has a higher probability of success
than the "canoe method". After a Hausman and McFadden (1984) test, we do not reject
the hypothesis that the IIA property is valid and the specication of a conditional logit is
correct (see Table 5).
The results presented in Table 5 show that individuals with high discount rates will
prefer the "canoe" and the "embassy" methods over the "visa method". A high preference
for the present involves people to nd others means to migrate. Moreover, it is often the
only possibility they have to reach the Northern countries. The more the expected wage is
important, the more likely it is that individuals would choose the "embassy method" rather
than the "visa method". Indeed, those who have high expectations of their migration project
would maximize their probability of success by choosing to corrupt someone and increase
their chances of getting legitimate documents rather than trying the legal way, knowing that
the probability to get a visa is lower for them. The more immigration policies are hardened,
the less likely it is that people will renounce their desire to migrate and the more they
will use "canoe" or "embassy" methods, which conrms our previous results. The variable
"log costs", is dropped because there is no within group variance. Indeed, the costs are, of
course, di¤erent according to the destinations countries, but they do not vary according to
the individuals. Then as robustness check, we choose to do a multinomial logit with only the
individuals characteristics (Table 6) and the results of the conditional logit are conrmed.
6We add alternative constants, (except for the reference category) to capture choice probabilities relative
to the reference alternative that cannot be attributed to the other explanatory variables.
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7 Concluding remarks and Implications
In the context of an international economic crisis, issues related to illegal migration
involve a lot of impassioned debates and controversies. In spite of the repressive policies,
the management of the ow of illegal migrants continues to be one of the main challenges
for many host countries. This highlights the problem of the e¢ciency of political measures
regarding this type of migration.
One of the main contributions of this paper is the proposition of a theoretical model
which allows us to measure empirically the time and risk preferences. We also study, both in
theoretical model and the empirical part how these variables a¤ect illegal migration decision
and the willingness to pay a smuggler with a probability of success equal to 1, compared
with a "classical" determinant of migration such as the expected wage. Our empirical re-
sults conrm the theoretical propositions. Indeed, it appears that if expectations remains a
determinant of migration, particularly of illegal migration and a strong determinant of the
willingness to pay a smuggler to succeed in the illegal migration project, the preference for
the present, measured by the discount rate, also play an important role in the illegal migra-
tion decision and has a positive inuence on the willingness to pay a smuggler and on the
choice of "canoe" or "embassy" method rather than a "visa" method. In terms of politicy
implications, it is important to take into account the individuals preferences all the more so
because the hardening of immigration policies for entering host countries has a pernicious
e¤ect on illegal migration. It deters those who want to migrate legally and incites the po-
tential migrants to turn to illegal methods such as paying a "passeur" or corrupting o¢cials
linked to the embassies and consular sections to get legal documents. Immigration policies,
for more e¢ciency, must integrate the determination and "the emergency" that these peo-
ple have to improve their living conditions. Then, policies have to be balanced with some
measures which promote circular migration with, for example, specic visa and status for
seasonal workers, or people who work in some sectors of services such as services to people.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics
Variables Mean Sd
Migrate illegally 0.40 0.49
Migration Method
"Canoe method" 0.55 0.50
"Embassy method" 0.29 0.46
Willingness to pay (Fcfa) 1 480 556 2 004 192
Discount rate 0.41 2.27
Expected wage (Fcfa) 1 567 466 5 486 186
Expected wage per capita 893 918 5 332 343
Wage (Fcfa) 76 055 64699
Wage per capita 22 189 22 908
Wage di¤erential (Fcfa) 1 539 478 5 677 601
Wage di¤erential per capita 894 566 5516554
Risk aversion 3.03e-07 1.33e-06
Costs (Fcfa) 2 212 166 1 761 269
Stay if hardening of
immigration policies
0.32 0.47
Relatives 0.74 0.44
Share of male children 0.18 0.24
Socio-demographic controls
Male 0.88 0.33
Age 25.96 7.18
Married 0.26 0.44
Education level
Secondary level 0.27 0.44
Higher level 0.16 0.37
Coranic school 0.15 0.36
Home owner 0.56 0.50
Mouride 0.45 0.50
Ethnic group
Lebou 0.19 0.39
Hal Pular 0.11 0.32
Serere 0.23 0.42
Diola 0.05 0.23
Others 0.08 0.27
Notes: 1 Euro = 655.56 Fcfa. The reference category of the variable "Migration Method"
is "visa method". The reference category of the variable "Education level" is Primary level.
The reference category of the variable "Ethnic group" is Wolof.
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Figure 1: Individual Coe¢cients of Absolute Risk Aversion
Table 2
Willingness to pay a smuggler with di¤erent probabilities of success
Mean Sd Obs
How much are you ready to pay if p = 1? 1 480 556 2 004 192 145
If p = 0.75, are you ready to migrate? 0.85 0.36 145
If yes, how much are you ready to pay? 1 351 829 1 952 752 123
If p = 0.50, are you ready to migrate? 0.77 0.43 145
If yes, how much are you ready to pay? 1 311 261 1 994 398 111
If p= 0.25, are you ready to migrate? 0.62 0.49 145
If yes, how much are you ready to pay ? 1 315 611 1 792 507 90
If p = 0.05, are you ready to migrate? 0.53 0.50 145
If yes, how much are you ready to pay? 1 264 200 1 592 063 75
Note: 1 Euro=656.56 Fcfa
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Table 3
Illegal Migration decision and Willingness to Pay: Heckman procedure
Migrate illegally Willingness to pay Migrate illegally Willingness to pay
(Selection equation) (Selection equation)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Discount rate 0.744** 0.132*** 0.721** 0.131***
(2.41) (3.45) (2.46) (3.66)
Log expected wage per
capita
0.227** 0.303***
(2.22) (3.06)
Log wage per capita -0.191 -0.188
(1.16) (1.60)
Log wage di¤erential per
capita
0.179** 0.225***
(2.09) (2.86)
Log risk aversion 0.037 -0.090* 0.044 -0.079*
(0.69) (1.92) (0.84) (1.70)
Log costs -1.015*** 0.103 -1.010*** 0.121
(7.51) (0.53) (7.41) (0.65)
Stay if hardening of im-
migration policies
-0.620** 0.768*** -0.606** 0.764***
(2.51) (3.10) (2.45) (3.03)
Relatives 0.510* -0.069 0.463* -0.121
(1.87) (0.22) (1.70) (0.38)
Share of male children -0.948** -0.818*
(2.23) (1.82)
Socio-demographic con-
trols
Yes Yes Yes Yes
IMR -0.030 -0.072
(0.07) (0.18)
Constant 11.093*** 7.536*** 10.175*** 6.935***
(4.16) (2.89) (4.16) (2.80)
Observations 281 281
Pseudo R2 0.54 0.54
Log pseudolikelihood -88.41 -88.59
Notes: Robust z-statistics in parentheses: * signicant at 10%;** signicant at 5%; ***
signicant at 1%.
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Table 4
Marginal E¤ects
Dependant variable: Migrate illegally
(1) (2)
Discount rate 0.293** 0.283**
Log expected wage per capita 0.089**
Log wage per capita 0.075
Log wage di¤erential per capita 0.070**
Log risk aversion 0.014 0.017
Log costs -0.40*** -0.397***
Stay if hardening of immigration policies -0.234*** -0.229***
Relatives 0.192** 0.175*
Share of male children -0.373** -0.321*
Socio-demographic controls Yes Yes
Observations 281 281
Notes: * signicant at 10%;** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 5
Conditional Logit: the choice of the method of migration
Canoe method Embassy method
(1) (2)
Coef. Odds Ratio z-stat Coef. Odds Ratio z-stat
Discount rate 1.083** 2.953** 2.29 1.129** 3.091** 2.37
Log expected wage per
capita
0.254 1.290 0.44 1.342** 3.825 2.10
Log wage per capita -1.070 0.343 1.23 -1.504 0.222 1.60
Log risk aversion 0.174 1.190 1.02 -0.243 0.784 1.14
Log costs dropped
Stay if hardening of
immigration policies
-1.672* 1.188* 1.69 -3.000** 0.050*** 2.40
Relatives 3.299** 27.10** 2.31 2.323 10.21 1.46
Share of male children 0.188 1.207 0.08 -2.860 0.057 0.98
Socio-demographic
controls
Yes Yes
"canoe method" -0.174 0.841 0.02
"embassy method" -33.78** 0.000** 2.01
Observations 396
Pseudo-R2 0.55
Log likelihood -64.64
Hausman and McFadden
Test
Chi2(15)=9.06
Prob>Chi2=0.8745
Notes: The reference category is "visa method". We multiply each alternative by the number of obser-
vations and the explanatory variables are some interaction terms between the individual characteristics
and the variables of choice. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 6
Robustness check: Multinomial Logit
Canoe Method Embassy Method
(1) (2)
Discount rate 1.525** 1.619**
(2.00) (2.11)
Log expected wage per capita 0.841 2.177*
(0.71) (1.76)
Log wage per capita -2.050 -2.680
(0.91) (1.17)
Log risk aversion 0.215 -0.221
(1.13) (0.93)
Stay if hardening of immigration policies -1.078 -2.942*
(0.74) (1.81)
Relatives 6.841** 5.895**
(2.44) (2.04)
Share of male children -3.776 -7.159*
(1.01) (1.79)
Socio-demographic controls Yes Yes
Constant 0.135 -46.155**
(0.01) (2.08)
Observations 132
Peudo-R2 0.50
Log likelihood -55.36
Hausman Test (IIA test) Canoe method: Prob>Chi2=1.000
Embassy method: Prob>Chi2=0.997
Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5; *** signicant at 1%.
22
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2011.04
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to (8) yields:
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<0
7 0;
dC
d

 
u00(w)
u0(w)
 =    u0(w)C
2
2
  [u0(w)  Cu00(w)]| {z }
<0
< 0: [QED]
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider second-order Taylor expansions of the elements of (9): u (w   C)  u(w) Cu0(w)+
C2
2
u00(w); u (w) = u (w +w)  u(w) + wu0(w) + w
2
2
u00(w), u (w +D)  u(w) +
Du0(w) + D
2
2
u00(w). Substitution into (9) then yields:
0 = u(w)  Cju
0(w) +
C2j
2
u00(w)| {z }
u(w Cj)
+
2
6664pj

u(w) + wu0(w) +
w2
2
u00(w)

| {z }
u(w)
+ (1  pj) u (w)
3
7775
1  (1 + )t T

 
2
664u(w) +Du0(w) + D
2
2
u00(w)| {z }
u(w+D)
+ u (w)
1  (1 + )t T

3
775 :
Dividing by u0(w) and letting A(w) =  u
00(w)
u0(w)
allows one to simplify this expression to:
0 =  Cj  
C2j
2
A(w) + pjw


1 
w
2
A(w)

1  (1 + )t T

 

D  
D2
2
A(w)

: (10)
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Now this indi¤erence relationship holds for any gamble .(Cj; pj). It follows, for gam-
bles (Cj; pj) and (Ck; pk), that  Cj  
C2j
2
A(w) + pjw


1  w

2
A(w)

1 (1+)t T

=  Ck  
C2
k
2
A(w) + pkw


1  w

2
A(w)

1 (1+)t T

, and thus that:
0 = Cj   Ck +

C2j
2
 
C2k
2

A(w) + (pk   pj)w


1 
w
2
A(w)

1  (1 + )t T

: (11)
Combining equations (10) and (11) then allows one to solve for the discount rate  and the
coe¢cient of absolute risk-aversion A(w) as given in the Proposition. [QED]
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